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What Did They Know and When Did 
They Know It? Pretesting as a Means 
Setting a Baseline for Assessing 
Learning Outcomes
Jeffrey L. Harrison
I. Introduction
Are legal rules intuitive or, at least, consistent with common sense? In this 
study, 260 law students at five law schools1 who had not taken contract law2 
were presented with eight questions based on specific contracts cases or 
common contracts issues. They were asked what they felt was the fair or 
right answer to each question and to formulate the rule they would apply. 
The purposes of the study were to a) determine whether contract law is what 
the untrained person believes it is or should be, and b) experiment with a 
strategy of pretesting to determine what topics within any course deserve 
special attention during a semester. The eight-question form, including the 
instructions each student was given, is attached as Appendix 1.
This type of pretesting has important implications and is adaptable to 
any law school course in which legal issues can be presented in the form 
of relatively simple problems. For example, it may identify areas that are 
particularly difficult for students to grasp and others that seem self-evident 
to most if not all students. This may affect the amount of time devoted to 
each topic and even the approach.3 Areas that seem to be easily grasped might 
be better-suited for a problem method of instruction, in which the students 
apply relatively easily understood doctrinal material to complex fact patterns. 
1. The colleges are the University of Florida, Gonzaga, Florida State, Chicago-Kent and 
Mitchell-Hamline. Thanks to Professors Allen Blair, George Dawson, Mark Fenster, Jake 
Linford, Adrian Walters, and an anonymous reviewer of a prior draft.
2. The questionnaire was administered on the first day of class or was presented electronically, 
with the answers due on the first day of class.
3. This, of course, leads to the dilemma every teacher must face: how much time to devote to 
students based on individual needs. For example, do you spend entire class periods in the 
hope of improving the understanding of five out of 100 students?
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Conversely, some more difficult material, or material that requires specialized 
knowledge, may be suitable for a lecture approach. 
Diagnostic surveys of this type also complement the American Bar 
Association’s requirement that schools study “learning outcomes.”4 One 
interpretation of these standards is that schools should assess the extent to 
which the education offered advances students’ understanding and abilities—
an assessment that is impossible without the baseline provided for by an initial 
diagnosis. It is hoped that this essay will open a discussion of whether it is 
appropriate to pretest students in many of their law school courses as a way of 
assessing how much time should be allocated to different units and the most 
beneficial approaches to instruction.
In the pages that follow, each question is presented5 along with the material 
on which it was based and the responses of those tested. The results are mixed; 
what is revealed is that preconceptions about contract law are sometimes 
consistent with actual contract law and oftentimes inconsistent. More 
interesting is that the students revealed themselves to be highly formalistic 
in some instances while having a sense of fairness in others. For example, 
those untrained in contract law have a formalistic view when confronted with 
issues of formation but more substantive views when problems arise after the 
contract is formed. And in some instances they demonstrate a surprising (to 
this author) ignorance of basic principles. At times they reveal gaps in their 
understanding of commercial norms. The final section discusses specific ways 
in which the results might influence the teaching of contract law, demonstrates 
the limitations of this type of study, and offers suggestions for further research. 
Before turning to the results of the experiment, an important disclaimer is in 
order. The questions asked may seem to endorse a certain approach to teaching 
contract law because many are based on well-known contract law “chestnuts.” 
No endorsement is intended. To some these cases may not be as relevant as they 
once were. Nevertheless, the cases and the issues they present are included in 
many contract casebooks, and those books continue to be organized around 
the usual topics of “offer and acceptance,” “consideration,” and so on. Thus, 
the pretesting illustrated here applies to what might be viewed as a traditional 
course. Perhaps this test is not appropriate in the nontraditional context, but 
that is separate from the question of whether pretesting has any utility. 
II. The Offer
A. The Question 
Jeff wants to buy Jane’s sports car. One night at a meeting of a car club of 
which they are both members, Jeff says to Jane, “What is the least you would 
4. See Am. BAr Ass’n, stAndArds & rules of Procedure for APProvAl of lAw schools 
2017-2018, Standards 301, 203, 314, 315 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_
education/resources/standards.html.
5. The ordering is roughly how the issues would be addressed in a traditional contracts class. 
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take to sell your car?” Jane replied, “I could not sell it for less than $7000.” Jeff 
says. “It’s a deal.” Is Jane obligated to sell the car to Jeff for $7000?
This question is based on Owen v. Tunison,6 in which the owner of property 
stated to a potential buyer that “it would not be possible for me to sell it unless 
I was to receive $16,000 cash.”7 The would-be buyer attempted to portray this 
as an offer that he accepted. The court merely noted that there was no offer 
to sell.8 Similarly in Harvey v. Facey,9 the “buyer” asked “would you sell?” and 
what is the “lowest cash price?” Upon receiving a response of 900 pounds, 
the buyer claimed a contract had been formed. Again, the court noted the 
distinction between a willingness to sell and the related notion of what the price 
would be if one were willing to sell. 
B. The Results
On this question the students were nearly unanimous in responding that 
there was no contract. In fact, of the eight questions asked, the results on 
this one were the most compelling in terms of demonstrating a base-level 
understanding of contract law. Some might reason that naming the lowest 
prices at which something would be sold is tantamount to saying that you 
would be willing to sell at that price. This theory is uniformly rejected by courts 
and, in the experiment, by the students. Although this one was easy for the 
students, it actually represented a trend throughout the study. On an intuitive 
level, students were unwilling to find a relationship had been formed unless 
the formal indicia of a relationship were present.10 In a sense, they arrive at law 
school as contract formalists. 
III. The Right to Revoke
A. The Question
Dick wanted to buy Dodd’s farm. He asked Dodd about it on Monday, 
June 6, and Dodd said he was willing to sell. In fact, he wrote on a piece of 
paper: “I am hereby offering to sell my farm, known as the Rock Creek 20, 
for $20,000. This offer will remain open until Saturday, June 11, at 9 a.m.” On 
Thursday, June 9, Dick heard that Dodd had sold the farm to someone else. 
Nevertheless, he came to Dodd’s house at 8 a.m. on the 11th and announced he 
was there to buy the farm. Dodd said it was sold. Do you think Dodd should 
either transfer the farm to Dick, if possible, or pay damages because he did not 
hold the offer open?
This question is obviously based on the classic Dickinson v. Dodds.11 The case 
stands for the idea that an offer not supported by consideration may be revoked 
6. 158 A. 926 (Me. 1932).
7. Id. at 927.
8. Id. 
9. [1893] PC 1 (Eng.).
10. This tendency is also found in questions 2 and 5.
11. [1876] 2 Ch. 463 (Eng.).
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by the offeror even though there appears to be a promise that it will remain 
open under certain conditions.12 An added issue found both in the original 
case and in the survey question was one of indirect revocation. In the actual 
case, whether Dickinson heard that Dodds had actually sold the property to 
someone else or was merely thinking about it is unclear.13 The survey question 
attempts to maintain this ambiguity by noting that Dick merely “heard” that 
the farm was sold. In addition, it makes it clear that Dick does attempt to 
accept before being directly informed of the revocation.
The survey question deviated from Dickinson v. Dodds in one important way. 
In the actual case, the written offer specified that it was made to Dickinson. In 
the hypothetical, Dodd simply said he was “offering to sell,” but there was no 
indication the offer was exclusively made to Dick. It was felt that the specific 
mention of Dickinson would almost certainly lead students to decide that the 
offer had to be held open for him. This is incorrect and would likely gloss over 
the principal issue of consideration. 14
B. The Results
Sixty-five percent of the students replied that Dodds should not be liable 
for not conveying the farm to Dick. Although the students got to a result 
consistent with the outcome of the case, the answers suggest general ignorance 
of one area of contract law but an intuitive understanding of another. The case 
was decided on the basis of a lack of consideration to keep the offer open. The 
students did not mention this.15 They did, however, note that the offer was 
not exclusive; Dick, therefore, should have known that it might be accepted 
by someone else. When Dick “heard” the property was sold, the offer was 
revoked. 
In effect, the majority of students applied the notion of indirect revocation 
but did not note the complexity of the concept. The problem is that whether 
an indirect revocation occurs depends on the source of the news.16 In no cases 
did the students question the validity of the indirect revocation, which would 
have been an important element of a fully informed response. Nevertheless, 
this is one instance in which the uninformed responses of the subjects seem 
to be in sync with contract law. It is noteworthy that, along with the offer 
12. See U.C.C. § 2-205. But this is not the case. 
13. The report of the case leaves it unclear as to whether Dickinson heard Dodds had sold the 
property or was offering to sell it. See e. AllAn fArnsworth, et Al., contrAct: cAses And 
mAteriAls 183 (8th ed. 2013). 
14. This was based on thirty years of teaching the case and finding that students were generally 
upset by the outcome. The idea that someone could make an offer to a specific person and 
promise it would be open for a certain period of time and then revoke it seemed to be viewed 
with substantial negativity.
15. If they had, it would have suggested some formal exposure to contracts, since the need for 
consideration is one of the mysteries of the common law of contracts.
16. restAtement (second) of contrActs § 43 (Am. lAw inst. 1969).
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hypothetical (above) and the sale of the diamond hypothetical17 (below), the 
intuitive responses seem to lean toward formality and an “arm’s-length” view 
of relationships at the formation stage.18
IV. Consideration and Family Contracts
A. The Question
When Sam graduated from high school, his older brother, Ben, said to him, 
“If you do not smoke cigarettes, drink alcohol, or take drugs while in college, 
I will give you $5000 when you graduate.” Sam did avoid these activities while 
in college and asked Ben for the $5000. Ben refused to pay, saying that Sam 
was better off because he did not smoke, drink, or take drugs. Should Sam be 
able to recover the $5000 from Ben?
This question is based on Hamer v. Sidway,19 which presents the issue of what 
counts as consideration. In that case, of course, the parties were a nephew 
and an uncle. The principal question is whether consideration flowing from 
one party to another (in the case, from the nephew to the uncle and, in the 
survey question, from the younger brother to the older brother) must be 
something (to put it simply) that harms or makes the performing party worse 
off or benefits the promising party. The answer of the court was that it was not 
necessary that a party be made worse off as long as he or she gave up a right. 
Nor was it necessary that the promising party enjoy any obvious gain. The 
case and the survey question also raise the issue of whether there should be 
judicial intervention in the case of relatively informal contracts between family 
members.20
B. The Results
The dual nature of the issue in the question may explain decidedly mixed 
answers from the students. Fifty-four percent of those surveyed concluded 
that the older brother should pay even though there was no writing and the 
agreement was between siblings. The sharp division among the students 
warranted a closer look at their reasoning. For example, those believing there 
was an obligation to pay may have applied an intuitive notion of consideration 
or, more likely, simply have felt one should keep his or her word. Conversely, 
those indicating there was no obligation to pay may have thought the contract 
was too informal to result in an obligation or that promising to do what was 
beneficial to oneself should not be consideration. 
As it turns out, nearly all those who believed there was an obligation to 
pay felt that there was a contract or, in their terms, “a promise is a promise.” 
17. See text at infra notes 29-32. 
18. No mention was made of the possibility, as has been argued, that consideration to keep the 
offer open was embedded in the price. See friedrich Kessler, GrAnt Gilmore & Anthony 
t. KronmAn, contrActs: cAses And mAteriAls 319 (3d ed. 1986) (quoting P. winfield, 
PollocK’s PrinciPles of contrActs 21 (13th ed. 1950)). 
19. 124 N.Y. 538 (N.Y. 1891).
20. fArnsworth, et Al., supra note 13, at 34-35. 
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Again, consideration appears to be a concept beyond their comprehension. A 
small handful (three) hinted at promissory estoppel by indicating the older 
brother should pay because the younger brother “relied.” Those who saw no 
obligation fell into three predictable categories: Some reasoned the promise 
by the older brother was merely a “gift”; others felt the contract needed to be 
in writing; and still others believed the promise should not have been taken 
seriously. It appears likely that all these misgivings could have been overcome 
if the parties had observed the formality of a writing. In any case, there was no 
indication that an intuitive notion of consideration played a role. Students did 
indicate some discomfort with involving the courts in a family dispute. 
V. Privity of Contract and Delegation
A. The Question
For several years the Smiths had their yard care provided by a company 
called Landscapes, Inc. Several months ago, they became dissatisfied with 
Landscapes, Inc., and told them that they were no longer willing to employ 
the company for yard care. They switched to Sam’s Yard Care. Two months 
ago Landscapes bought out Sam’s and began working on the yards of all of 
Sam’s customers, including the Smiths. The Smiths eventually learned about 
this and refused to pay for the last two months of lawn care, saying they did 
not want lawn care from Landscapes. Do they have to pay for the two months 
of care?
The problem has more than one layer. For example, can a party be obligated 
to pay for the services rendered by someone he or she has previously rejected 
as a contracting partner or in a case in which privity is lacking? This layer 
of the question is based on Boston Ice Co. v. Potter,21 in which Potter first dealt 
with Boston Ice but found its service unsatisfactory and switched to Citizens 
Ice. Boston Ice later acquired Citizens and delivered for a year with Potter’s 
knowledge. When billed, Potter’s refusal to pay was upheld by the court 
because of a lack of privity.22 
Boston Ice was an 1877 case, and the law of assignment and delegation has 
evolved since then.23 This gives rise to a second layer. As contracts teachers 
know, assignment refers to granting to a third party the benefits a contracting 
party would have received. Delegation, a touchier matter, means having a 
third party perform whatever performance was due from the contracting party. 
Today, as a general matter, we say that duties can be delegated as long as 
21. 123 Mass 28 (1877).
22. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law 
Theory, 20 GA. l. rev. 323, 379 (1986); Arthur l. corBin, corBin on contrActs 807-08 
(1952). 
23. Cf. Boulton v. Jones (1857) 157 Eng. Rep. 232 (The defendant had not expressed a desire not 
to deal with the plaintiff). 
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they are not personal services.24 In simple terms, one could can delegate the 
obligation to deliver a new refrigerator but not to paint a portrait. 
Another layer of the question raises the issue of restitution. Even if the lawn 
care were regarded as a personal service and payment was unenforceable as a 
matter of contract principles, could Landscapes recover based on the benefits 
conferred? Thus, the problem raised a combination of issues ranging from 
privity to restitution.
B. The Results
Eighty-two percent of the students reported that Smith should pay for the 
lawn service. The reasoning of the other eighteen percent was predictable. 
From their points of view, the Smiths should not have to pay for lawn service 
from a company they had not selected. The reasoning of the eighty-two percent 
is more intriguing. Either they felt at some intuitive level that lawn care was 
essentially fungible, and thus similar to the refrigerator noted above, or they 
felt it was simply unfair to receive two months of lawn care free. A closer look 
at this second group revealed three lines of reasoning. Some students wrote 
no more than that the services were rendered and should be paid for.25 Others 
took another step and said it was the duty of the Smiths to know who was 
performing the lawn care. Still others qualified their answers by saying that 
payment was due as long as the Smiths were aware of the change in companies. 
This group is probably fairly viewed as being more consistent with those who 
felt the Smiths should not have to pay at all since the implication is that one 
need not pay for services rendered by an objectionable third party. Although 
this offsets the strength of the eighty-two percent vote, the general sense of the 
students seems to be that one must pay for benefits received.
VI. Contract Modification/Duress
A. The Question
Tom owns a construction company and makes a contract to build a house 
for Richard for $200,000. It is understood that Richard will move in on July 
31. Richard makes arrangements to move on that date, including paying in 
advance for moving services. He also cancels the lease on the apartment he 
and his family have been living in. On July 25, Tom tells Richard that the 
house will not be ready on time unless Richard agrees to pay an extra $10,000. 
Richard agrees and the house is ready on July 31. When Tom asks for the 
$10,000, Richard refuses to pay. Should he have to pay?
This question was not based on a specific contracts case but was designed to 
raise the issues of modification without consideration and duress. As far as the 
students knew, Tom was offering to do no more than he originally contracted 
to do. In addition, the question was slanted to make it appear that Richard 
was in a difficult position. The date of Tom’s threat—just six days before the 
move-in date—was supposed to increase the pressure on Richard to agree to 
24. restAtement (second) of contrActs §318 (Am. Law Inst. 1969).
25. To paraphrase a common response, “they already received the service”.
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what is a fairly substantial price increase at the eleventh hour. The problem is 
that Richard, rather than show any signs of resistance, agreed to pay the extra.
Duress is defined as an improper threat that leaves the other party no 
reasonable alternative.26 It is not clear that, in reality, the problem would be 
treated by a court as duress, since Richard could have simply refused and 
claimed a breach of contract if Tom carried through on his threat. When 
it comes to modification, the standard rule is that a modification without 
consideration is not enforceable unless made in light of an unforeseen event.27 
The problem was purposefully drafted to avoid creating the impression that 
Tom had run into some type of problem.28
B. The Results
Sixty percent of those responding felt that Richard was obligated to pay the 
addition $10,000. The reasoning of this group was fairly consistent—Richard 
must pay because he promised, or, as one student put it, “He has to pay it; that’s 
the way it goes.” The forty percent who indicated payment was not necessary 
took formalism one step further. Several students in this category reasoned 
that the agreement to pay the extra $10,000 was not in writing and thus was 
not enforceable. (The question did not specify either way.) Those who felt 
payment was not necessary but did not rely on a lack of writing usually said 
the parties already had made a bargain and that Tom could not change it. 
As a general matter, the students demonstrated little understanding of the 
situations in which a modification is enforceable. This may relate to general 
ignorance about the doctrine of consideration. Similarly, the portions of 
the question that were supposed to lead them to conclude that Tom had 
Richard at a disadvantage and used his leverage made little impression. 
Obviously the students here did not feel that Richard was “forced” into 
anything. Almost certainly if the $10,000 promise had been made at gunpoint 
or in the context or a physical threat to a loved one, the students would have 
found it unenforceable. Just how far from these extreme examples a threat 
would have to be is not clear, but then it is not clear in contract law generally. 
VII. Mutual Mistake: A Rock or a Diamond?
A. The Question
Smith found a rock while hiking in the mountains. That afternoon she went 
to a jewelry store to buy a hat pin. While there she asked the jeweler, Jack, if 
he knew what the rock was. Jack had never seen an uncut diamond and told 
Smith he did not know what it was but it could be a topaz. He offered to buy 
it for $50. Smith accepted the offer. A few days later, Smith realized the stone 
was an uncut diamond worth $5000. She returned to the jewelry store and 
26. restAtement (second) of contrActs §175 (Am. Law Inst. 1969).
27. Id. §318.
28. Although perhaps the point is overly subtle, Richard is told the house “will not be ready,” 
not that it “cannot be ready”.
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offered to refund the $50 to get the diamond back. The store refused to sell it 
back for $50. Should the store be required to return the stone for $50? 
Contracts professors will recognize this question as based on Wood v. 
Boynton.29 The prices and values have been changed and the facts objectified 
in the sense that Smith is not described, as she was in the original case, as 
needing money “pretty badly.”30 The answer in the case was that no refund was 
due. This is likely consistent with the current Restatement of Contracts31 under the 
theory that Smith assumed the risk of the mistake by virtue of her conscious 
ignorance. This assumes, however, that Jack did not provide Smith with 
misleading information. 
B. The Results
Under this variation of the facts, eighty-seven percent of the students said 
the diamond should remain with Jack. The reasoning was fairly clearly along 
the lines of “a deal is a deal,” or that Smith was at fault (assumed the risk) by 
selling the stone. The nature of the reasoning suggested a highly formalistic, 
seller/buyer-beware view of contract law when issues arise at the formation 
stage.32 It is not clear whether the result would change, or if it did by how 
much, if the facts were given, as they are in the case, with Smith portrayed 
as someone needing the money “very badly.” Nevertheless, the notion of 
assuming the risk or, in more informal terms, buyer or seller beware seems to 
be a compelling influence on those without formal contract training.
VIII. Trade Usage
Zeke starts a lawn-care business for the first time. He is able to sign up ten 
new customers. Each week he mows their yards. Things go smoothly until the 
grass in some of their yards turns brown. It is determined that the yards need 
to be fertilized and Zeke has not done it. The homeowners tell Zeke correctly 
that all the other lawn-care services in town that charge the same price as Zeke 
include fertilizing the yard in their price for “lawn care.” Zeke did not know 
this. The customers say he should have known it before saying his business is 
“lawn care.” Should Zeke be required to fertilize the yards of his customers?
This question can be viewed as having two layers. First, a student employing 
an intuitive notion of the “four corners” approach to contract interpretation 
may have wondered why it was even relevant that other companies included 
fertilizing as part of their service. In effect, as a technical matter, the fact that 
there may be a relevant trade usage would be unimportant unless there was 
an ambiguity.
Additionally, a student could recognize the possibility of an ambiguity and 
still not be sure of the relevance of trade usage in light of a newcomer to an 
29. 25 N.W. 42 (1885). 
30. Id. at 43.
31. restAtement (second) of contrActs §154(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
32. See also question 3 discussed above. 
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industry. Holding even newcomers to the usage can lower transaction costs in 
that customers and suppliers can make certain assumptions about the meaning 
of terms. This, however, shifts the burden to the newcomer and, arguably, 
raises the costs of entry into the field and inhibits competition. Some courts, as 
illustrated in the Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp.,33 adopt 
a middle ground and apply trade usage only when it is well-established and 
“notorious.”
B. The Results 
Students by a wide majority (seventy-six percent) rejected the notion that 
Zeke should be responsible for fertilizing the yards of his customers, even 
though the question attempts to lead them to the understanding that the 
customers could reasonably believe fertilizing was included under the term 
“lawn care.” Here again student comments reveal a formalistic view of contract. 
Many announced the rule that Zeke was not responsible for fertilizing the 
yards because it was not found expressly in their contracts. For these students, 
evidently nothing was ambiguous about the term “lawn care,” and this could 
be determined in light of their personal understanding.34 Some hinted at a 
sense of ambiguity by applying risk-allocation/buyer-beware reasoning and 
stating that it was up to the buyers to know what they were getting. 
No students expressly applied a two-step analysis of a) determining there 
was an ambiguity, and b) deciding whether Zeke should be held to trade usage. 
Nevertheless, a quarter of the students did say Zeke should provide fertilizing, 
and uniformly they indicated it was because it was his responsibility to know 
what his customers were likely to expect. It is possible that before making that 
step they first concluded the term “lawn service” could be reasonably viewed 
as including fertilization but, if so, this was not evident in their responses.
IX. Expectancy as a Remedy
A. The question: 
Thomas decided he wanted to buy Tim’s 1999 Honda. He offered to pay 
$2000, and Tim agreed to sell it for that price. Under the terms of their 
agreement, they were to meet one week later. At that time, Thomas would 
present the $2000 and Tim would give him the car, including its title and 
keys. One week later they did meet but Tim informed Thomas that the car 
had already been sold to Janice. There is no question that this was a breach 
of their agreement. That afternoon Thomas searched the Internet and found 
that the price on a similar car was $2100. How much should Thomas recover 
from Tim, if anything?
33. 190 F.Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y., 1960).
34. Arguably this is precisely the type of bias Judge Traynor warned against in Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (1968). 
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It was expected that remedies could be a difficult subject for the students. 
For that reason, the simplest possible remedies problem was devised. It 
purposely did not involve issues of mitigation35 or consequential damages. 
B. The Results 
In the experiment, the answer of $100 was treated as consistent with 
existing contract law.36 Of the students surveyed, thirty-five percent answered 
$100. Those who did not answer $100 typically answered either zero or $2000. 
Those answering zero explained their answers by saying Thomas had not 
been harmed.37 One supposes this is because Thomas had not yet paid. Those 
answering $2000 (seventeen percent) “reasoned” that $2000 was due since it 
was the price of the car. One explanation for this outcome is that the students 
simply did not read the question carefully and assumed Thomas had paid 
and was due a refund. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the notion 
of expectancy is not an obvious one, at least not when posed in the form 
of a hypothetical. It seems likely, though, that if confronted with a real-life 
situation, the nonbreaching party would think in terms of the position he or 
she would have been in had there been performance. 
X. The Takeaway
The results of this modest experiment can be viewed from two perspectives. 
First, what are the layperson’s impressions of some basic contract law 
doctrines? Second, could a study like this be employed to inform the teaching 
of contract law? By extension, could similar studies in torts, property, or any 
course in which critical issues can be presented as relatively simply problems 
help determine time allocations and teaching methods?
A. What Do They Know About Contracts?
As for what those without formal training in contract law believe, the results 
are perhaps not surprising. The subjects revealed a very formalistic, arm’s-
length view of contracts. Many responses depended of whether there was a 
“writing” involved.38 The notion that one was stuck with a deal once it was 
in writing seemed to pervade the results. The diamond, once mistakenly sold, 
was gone; the agreement to pay $10,000 for nothing in the context of the 
unfinished house was to be paid; fertilizing that yard, even though arguably 
required by trade usage, was unnecessary unless the contract requires it. On a 
more general level, and not surprisingly, the notion of consideration is foreign. 
It could have figured into problems involving the offer from Dick to Dodds, 
35. It is only a hunch, but it seems likely that mitigation, at least is some instances, would be 
regarded as a necessity to the relatively untrained. 
36. A few students seem to use $100 as a base and note that there could be other expenses 
associated with the breach along the lines of what are called incidental or consequential 
damages. These students were included among those viewed as giving the right answer. 
37. Arguably, these students were applying a reliance measure of damages, but the explanations 
did not reveal even a rudimentary understanding of reliance.
38. This formalistic view also seemed to rule out relational contract theory.
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the promise from the older to the younger brother, and the $10,000 promise 
from the homeowner to the builder, but there did not appear to be even a 
shadow of an intuitive awareness of consideration. 
There is also the puzzle of contract remedies. In the simplest possible 
problem included here, more than half those responding gave a wrong answer. 
What makes this puzzling is that they do, in fact, in real life have a sense of 
being entitled to expectancy. If a layperson agrees to buy a new car from one 
dealer for $10,000 and this is followed by a breach and a purchase of the same 
model from another dealer for $11,000, it seems almost certain that the buyer 
would look to the initial seller to make up the difference. 
Although the issue was touched on only briefly, the students did seem to 
express an underlying sense of fairness when it came to unjust enrichment. 
In the question concerning the landscaping by an unwanted firm, students 
consistently felt the services rendered must be paid for. This may be seen to 
be offset by their response to the problem involving the rock that turned out 
to be a diamond. There is a difference, though. In the diamond case either the 
jeweler or the seller would enjoy a windfall. In the lawn-care case, allowing the 
homeowner not to pay would have resulted in a windfall, but only at the lawn-
care service’s expense. Thus, students were particularly sensitive to unjust 
enrichment when the result was unjust impoverishment of another.
B. Teaching Implications
This modest effort to develop a diagnostic tool for contracts can be 
improved on. Nevertheless, suppose this sample of 260 students comprised 
a single contracts class; what might a contracts teacher take away from the 
exercise? It will probably come as no surprise to any contracts professor 
that contract remedies are difficult. Based on this study, one might devote 
additional time to remedies and, especially, adopt a problems method to the 
teaching of remedies. Along with remedies, consideration is an area in which 
students arrive in class as blank slates. It can arise in the context of offer and 
acceptance, formation generally, and modification. Perhaps there cannot be 
too much emphasis on the doctrine.
In this hypothetical class, the greatest challenge would be to demystify 
contract law. Oddly, this is done by emphasizing the complexity of contract 
law. This group of students came with the impression that if it is written 
or someone “agrees,” that is the end of the story. They seem to envision a 
contract as a magical piece of paper with the heading “CONTRACT” that 
solves most if not all problems. Indeed, this may simply reflect cultural norms 
more generally than about the substance of contract law. What is missing is an 
understanding of how that document or, more likely, a far less formal version 
of the contract came to exist and the implications of variations in that process. 
For example, to this group of students you owe an extra $10,000 to have a 
house built simply because you said you would pay. Or you are not obligated 
to fertilize yards even though everyone else in the trade does so simply because 
you did not say you would or it is not “in writing.”
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The pretest results for this class impart four very practical lessons. First, 
the importance of a writing or the lack of a writing needs to be emphasized. 
Some documents need to be in writing but many do not. And even when a 
writing is necessary, the analysis can be complex. “It is in writing” is rarely 
the answer. Second, this particular group of 260 seemed to lack the type of 
life experience that would alert them to the malleability of contract law and 
to commercial reality. Doctrines like trade usage, course of performance, and 
course of dealing are all likely to come as surprises to this group of students. 
Third, if I were teaching this group, I would also devote problem-solving time 
to remedies. Finally, a few days on assignment and delegation would be useful. 
C. Some Limitations and Further Research
This effort is intended to be no more than an illustration of pretesting. As 
noted at the outset, it reflects what might be called a traditional approach 
to contract law. Precisely how contract law should be taught is a different 
question. In this respect, any effort to pretest should be preceded by a process 
of defining goals for a class. Those goals could differ from the ones implicit 
in this example. In addition, the possibility of pretesting does not solve the 
dilemma faced by every teacher about how much time to spend on each topic 
when the test shows that a minority of students do not grasp a topic. For 
example, is it good teaching to spend an hour or so on a topic that seems to be 
well-understood by all but ten of 100 students?
Another factor to keep in mind is that testing is always limited. For example, 
in this case, we know that some portion of the students reacted to the survey 
questions in a matter that was consistent with contract doctrine. That is not a 
substitute for knowing the policy behind the doctrine or how it would apply 
in a context in which policies compete. That type of information might be 
obtained from a more comprehensive form of pretesting. On the other hand, 
a simple test like the one employed here can provide important baseline 
information. 
Finally, in this exercise, the students from each school had very similar 
results. That does not mean all students within each class were similar. Some 
of us teach classes made up of predominantly twenty-four-year-olds who have 
had little or no exposure to contract-type issues and who have little professional 
experience. Other teachers may teach in part-time programs or night programs 
in which students are older and sometimes convinced, rightly or wrongly, 
that they know contract law. Because of the potential socioeconomic and 
demographic differences from law school to law school and class to class, 
the next iteration of a study like this should involve collecting important 
information about other variables—age, parents’ education, undergraduate 
major, work experience, LSAT score—that may well be valuable in making 
course-design and time-allocation decisions.
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Appendix
INSTRUCTIONS
Below are eight fact patterns dealing with very common problems in the 
area of contract law. Please read each one and then write what you think 
should happen and what general rule should be applied. There are no “right” 
or “wrong” answers. Please just write what you think is the fair outcome. Do 
not put your name on your answer sheet. The purpose of the experiment will 
be explained as soon as you are finished. Thank you.
I. Thomas decided he wanted to buy Tim’s 1999 Honda. He offered to 
pay $2000, and Tim agreed to sell it for that price. Under the terms of their 
agreement, they were to meet one week later. At that time Thomas would 
present the $2000 and Tim would give him the car, including its title and 
keys. One week later they did meet, but Tim informed Thomas that the car 
had already been sold to Janice. There is no question that this was a breach 
of their agreement. That afternoon Thomas searched the Internet and found 
that the price on a similar car was $2100. How much should Thomas recover 
from Tim, if anything?
1. The amount _____________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
2. Your rule _______________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
II. Smith found a rock while hiking in the mountains. That afternoon she 
went to a jewelry store to buy a hat pin. While there she asked the jeweler, Jack, 
if he knew what the rock was. Jack had never seen an uncut diamond and told 
Smith he did not know what it was but it could be a topaz. He offered to buy 
it for $50. Smith accepted the offer. A few days later, Smith realized the stone 
was an uncut diamond worth $5000. She returned to the jewelry store and 
offered to refund the $50 to get the diamond back. The store refused to sell it 
back for $50. Should the store be required to return the stone for $50?
1. Your answer ____________________________________
2. Your rule _______________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
III. Dick wanted to buy Dodd’s farm. He asked Dodd about it on Monday, 
June 6, and Dodd said he was willing to sell. In fact, he wrote on a piece of 
paper: “I am hereby offering to sell my farm, known as the Rock Creek 20, 
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for $20,000. This offer will remain open until Saturday, June 11, at 9 a.m.” On 
Thursday, June 9, Dick heard that Dodd had sold the farm to someone else. 
Nevertheless, he came to Dodd’s house at 8 a.m. on the 11th and announced he 
was there to buy the farm. Dodd said it was sold. Do you think Dodd should 
either transfer the farm to Dick, if possible, or pay damages because he did not 
hold the offer open? 
1. Your answer _____________________________________
2. Your rule _______________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
IV. For several years the Smiths had their yard care provided by a company 
called Landscapes, Inc. Several months ago, they became dissatisfied with 
Landscapes, Inc., and told them that they were no longer willing to employ 
the company for yard care. They switched to Sam’s Yard Care. Two months 
ago Landscapes bought out Sam’s and began working on the yards of all of 
Sam’s customers, including the Smiths. The Smiths eventually learned about 
this and refused to pay for the last two months of lawn care, saying they did 
not want lawn care from Landscapes. Do they have to pay for the two months 
of care?
1. Your answer _____________________________________
2. Your rule _______________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
V. Tom owns a construction company and makes a contract to build a house 
for Richard for $200,000. It is understood that Richard will move in on July 
31. Richard makes arrangements to move on that date, including paying in 
advance for moving services. He also cancels the lease on the apartment he 
and his family have been living in. On July 25 Tom tells Richard that the 
house will not be ready on time unless Richard agrees to pay an extra $10,000. 
Richard agrees and the house is ready on July 31. When Tom asks for the 
$10,000 Richard refuses to pay. Should he have to pay?
1. Your answer _____________________________________
2. Your rule _______________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
VI. When Sam graduated from high school, his older brother, Ben, said 
to him, “If you do not smoke cigarettes, drink alcohol, or take drugs while 
in college, I will give you $5000 when you graduate.” Sam did avoid these 
activities while in college and asked Ben for the $5000. Ben refused to pay, 
saying that Sam was better off because he did not smoke, drink, or take drugs. 
Should Sam be able to recover the $5000 from Ben?
1. Your answer _____________________________________
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2. Your rule _______________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
VII. Jeff wants to buy Jane’s sports car. One night at a meeting of a car club 
of which they are both members, Jeff says to Jane, “What is the least you 
would take to sell your car?” Jane replied, “I could not sell it for less than 
$7000.” Jeff says. “It’s a deal.” Is Jane obligated to sell the car to Jeff for 
$7000?
1. Your answer _____________________________________
2. Your rule _______________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
VIII. Zeke starts a lawn-care business for the first time. He is able to sign up 
ten new customers. Each week he mows their yards. Things go smoothly until 
the grass in some of their yards turns brown. It is determined that the yards 
need to be fertilized and Zeke has not done it. The homeowners tell Zeke 
correctly that all the other lawn-care services in town that charge the same 
price as Zeke include fertilizing the yard in their price for “lawn care.” Zeke 
did not know this. The customers say he should have known it before saying 
his business is “lawn care.” Should Zeke be required to fertilize the yards of 
his customers?
1. Your answer _____________________________________
2. Your rule _______________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
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